Introduction
The use of default settings in defined contribution (DC) plans is increasing both in the United States (U.S.) and in Australia. A variety of drivers are responsible for the use of default settings in these plans. Behavioral science research indicates that default settings may counteract the effect of inertia, which causes people to make less than optimal decisions in DC plans, and other impediments to optimal decision making. 2 Research on the effect of investment allocation in 401(k) 3 plan accounts on losses during the financial crisis highlighted the danger of investment allocations concentrated in high risk assets, particularly for participants close to retirement. 4 As a general policy matter, in the U.S. concern has long 1 Arthur F. 2 existed over the numbers of employees who do not participate in 401(k) plans even when they have the opportunity to do so. 5 Although both countries have increased the use of default settings in DC plans, U.S. and Australian policy makers have taken different approaches to important aspects of default investment products. Both countries take a prescriptive approach to regulation. The net result of U.S. default regulation, however, is that employers are responsible as fiduciaries for the selection and monitoring of default (and all other) investment products offered in their plans.
Other actors involved with the selection, monitoring and management of those investment products frequently have limited obligations to the plan participants whose retirement assets are invested. 6 To date, U.S. regulators have addressed issues observed with default investment products during the financial crisis by proposing that participants who hold certain types of default investment products receive additional disclosures. In contrast, Australia is in the process of setting strict substantive standards for the default investment products and enhancing the fiduciary obligations of the trustees responsible for the management and investment of those products. 7 This Article begins, in Part II, with a very brief overview of the DC system in the U.S. and a more detailed discussion of the Australian system. Parts III and IV respectively turn to an analysis of the use of default settings in each country. Part V suggests two lessons for the U. 8 is 9 percent, or through enterprise agreements or modern awards, the system that replaced industry awards, or employee contracts. So, there is no need in the SG System for an employer to set a specific default for the level of an employee's contribution. However, once SG System members received the right to choose both the fund and the investment product that would receive their contributions, investment default settings became important.
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ii.
System as of 2010 and beyond
In June 2010, an expert panel that had been constituted by the Australian government issued a report, known as the "Cooper Report," on its findings and recommendations. Four categories of investment products qualify as QDIAs. A short-term, capital preservation product is permitted only for the first 120 days of an employee's plan participation.
Of the three long-term QDIA options, one permits selection of a product that contains investments tailored to account for characteristics of the plan participants as a group. The other two QDIA options must be tailored to the characteristics of individual participants. 40 The regulations explicitly state that "targeted-retirement-date" funds, more commonly known as target date funds (TDFs), may qualify as a QDIA. plans, particularly when they are selected as QDIAs. To date the DOL's proposed regulatory revisions rely on enhanced disclosure to respond to the issues it observed with QDIAs.
Specifically, the DOL's proposed regulations, developed in collaboration with the SEC, would require that participants in TDFs, including participants defaulted into those funds designated as QDIAs, receive information about the TDF. The disclosure must discuss asset allocation and how the allocation changes over time, the fees and costs, and a warning that losses are possible in TDFs. 48 In addition to the proposed amendments to disclosure regulations, the DOL and SEC held joint hearings in 2009 regarding TDFs. 49 As a result, in mid-2010 the two agencies published a joint investor bulletin intended to educate investors about TDFs.
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The DOL and SEC efforts to enhance disclosure about TDFs, although undoubtedly well intentioned, may have a limited or even a harmful effect. A significant body of research indicates that "mandated disclosure as a remedy . . . is often ineffective." 51 Studies in behavioral branches of psychology, economics and ethics as well as cognitive science indicate that disclosure often fails to enable the person receiving the disclosure to act rationally and may result in worse substantive behavior by the person providing the disclosure. 52 In addition, relying on disclosure to address a problem with default settings is inconsistent with a belief that one of the primary purposes of default settings is to permit people to remain disengaged from active decision making.
IV. Australian Approach to Defaults a. "Current" default investments in superannuation funds
As noted above, 53 when Australians received the right to choose a fund and investment product to receive their SG System contributions, it became necessary to establish a default investment product for contributions in situations where a member did not make an affirmative investment choice. Australia used various mechanisms to determine the default investment product. In some instances the default fund and product were negotiated through enterprise agreements or modern awards. In other situations the employer typically selected a fund and product to receive contributions made on behalf of the employees. Regardless of whether the default fund and investment product were selected through enterprise agreements, modern awards or unilaterally by an employer, typically the relevant industry fund and its default investment product have been designated as the defaults. The key reforms for purposes of this article are those related to development of MySuper products, which will serve as the default investments for individuals who do not choose an investment fund or product. MySuper products also will be an available investment option for SG System members who wish to elect a simple, diversified, low-cost investment members enter the decumulation phase, they must transfer their assets to another investment product.
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Trustees of MySuper products will be subject to an enhanced set of duties, which they will owe to members. Trustees, sometimes referred to as corporate trustees, are the entities that hold the SG System account assets and under Australian law they are fiduciaries. There is a basic set of requirements for SG System trustees that applies to all corporate trustees of funds that hold SG System assets. The enhanced obligations of MySuper trustees essentially will operate as an additional layer of duties. The enhanced duties required of MySuper trustees are to:
• promote the financial interests of MySuper members, in particular net returns; • annually assess sufficiency of scale; and • Include in their investment strategy an investment return target and level of risk for MySuper members.
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In addition the trustees must be licensed and meet specific standards with respect to the operation of a MySuper product.
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The trustees that hold SG System assets are governed by a board of directors, sometimes referred to as trustee-directors. The trustee-directors of any fund that offers a
MySuper product also will be subject to an enhanced set of duties. Each trustee-director will have an obligation to ensure that the fund's corporate trustee fulfill its obligations, including the duties specific to MySuper products. The imposition of enhanced standards on the trustees and director-trustees of MySuper products is consistent with the Cooper Panel's finding that Australia's earlier grant to members of the right to choose investment funds and products failed to result in a competitive fund market and optimal investment decision-making. The panel observed that the failure of many members to affirmatively make a fund election contributed to the lack of an efficient market for SG System funds but other factors also contributed. According to the panel, members lack awareness of the performance and fees associated with their retirement investments in part because they do not actively make payments into their accounts and, in many cases, do not expect to access the funds for many years. In addition fund performance and fees often can be difficult to compare and switching funds takes effort and time.
63

V. Lessons for the U.S.
In recent years the U.S. and Australia have increasingly recognized the value of default settings in defined contribution plans. The significant differences between their approaches to private-sector retirement plans carry over into the policy decisions they have made on default settings. Two characteristics of the Australian approach offer lessons for the U.S. First, Australia has recognized that many people who opt, implicitly or explicitly, into the default investment products do not want to be actively involved in monitoring the investments in their accounts.
Second, employers also may not have the expertise or the inclination to become experts in investment product selection and monitoring.
a. Disclosure and Default Investment Products
Consider what the U.S. learned about default investment products from the financial crisis. With respect to TDFs, EBSA determined that some participants in TDFs designated as
QDIAs had incurred significant losses because some TDFs had maintained substantial equity 63 Cooper I at 7-8.
18
allocations even with near-term target retirement dates. EBSA's short-term response, coordinated with the SEC, was to issue an investor bulletin explaining the risks of investing in
TDFs. 64 The bulletin contained three pages of useful information in an easy to read format combining charts and questions and answers. 65 In the longer term, EBSA has been drafting enhanced disclosure guidelines that would require plans to provide participants in QDIAs more information about those funds. 66 Ultimately that guidance and the required disclosures are likely to include valuable information for the plan sponsors and participants that read and understand them.
However, any approach that addresses issues with default investment products through education and disclosure is entirely inconsistent with the principles of a default regime. As
Australia recognizes, no retirement system can rely on all individuals in the system to acquire and exercise the expertise required to make appropriate investment decisions. The U.S.
implicitly decided that investment education and individual decision-making are of limited value for some participants when Congress provided, through the PPA, incentives for plans to implement automatic enrollment. There is nothing in the U.S. system of 401(k) and similar accounts that ensures that participants will read investor bulletins, disclosures delivered by their employers or any other investment-related materials, let alone that they will understand that material or take action based on it. Research indicates that many participants do none of those things. And, research on the efficacy of disclosure increasingly indicates that disclosures are 19 ineffective to address conflicts of interest. 67 That general research on disclosures is consistent with the research into heuristics and biases in 401(k) plan decision making.
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The success of a system of defaults, especially defaults into investment products, depends on the selection of appropriate default settings. It is incoherent to believe that default settings are important because an overwhelming array of research shows that individuals are subject to biases, lack interest in becoming investment experts, etc. and then, when it turns out that there may be issues with some default settings respond by providing information to those same individuals so they can determine whether the default settings are appropriate or not. By definition, the appropriate locus of decision making in default settings is not the individual plan participant. That raises the obvious question of where the locus of decision making and legal liability should be. On this point, Australia's approach also offers lessons for the U.S.
b. The Role of Employers and Financial Services Firms in a Default System
In the U.S., plan sponsors, or to be more transparent, the employers who voluntarily sponsor 401(k) and other DC plans, nearly always make the decisions on what investments are offered in those plans, including the decision on the plan's default option, typically a QDIA. In selecting the QDIA, the plan sponsor acts as a fiduciary, and must prudently select and monitor 
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ASIC. There is little or no liability for an employer that chooses a MySuper product in this system if it turns out that the product has high fees, a poor investment strategy, or the product's trustee fails to execute its duties to fund members.
Instead, the trustees of the MySuper product bear not just the standard fiduciary obligations of fund trustees but also the enhanced responsibility to ensure that the investments and fees are appropriate for the employees whose retirement savings are invested in their
MySuper product. Thus, in Australia, the responsibility for appropriate investment decisions, including decisions that affect product fees, coincides with both the locus of investment expertise and responsibility for investment strategy. Or, to state it slightly differently, the fiduciary responsibility owed to those whose retirement assets are invested with MySuper funds will reside with those with the expertise and power to manage funds.
VI. Conclusion
The U.S. and Australia have both increased the use of default settings in the employment-based DC components of their retirement income systems. This is consistent with a growing body of research that indicates that many employees do not want to actively manage their retirement savings and financial education may not be very effective. The difference between the two countries is that Australia is in the process of implementing a system of default investment products that recognizes and respects the different levels of involvement desired by different employees. That system of default investment products provides substantive protections for those who trust their retirement assets to the default system by holding accountable the providers of the default products. There are significant differences between the U.S. and Australian retirement systems, including the Australian mandatory contribution.
However, the U.S. should consider whether a system that provides for default retirement investments owes more than just enhanced disclosure obligations to those who trust their 22 retirement savings to the system. And, in a system of voluntary plan sponsorship, it is not obvious why the employers who sponsor DC plans should have fiduciary liability for the selection and monitoring of default investment products.
